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NUCLEAR FUTURES
JOSEPH P. TOMAIN†
INTRODUCTION
The Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum Symposium “Environmental Regulation, Energy & Market Entry” is both important
and timely and the editors are to be congratulated for this project.
The Symposium is important, linking as it does energy and the environment and raising the question of how these two regulatory regimes
affect our energy future. It has been the case for some time that energy lawyers and policymakers speak a language different than environmental lawyers and policymakers even though energy and the en1
vironment are of a whole. Environmental impacts occur throughout
all energy fuel cycles. Indeed, the consistent market imperfection in
energy production, distribution, and use involves the negative externalities of pollution in its many forms.2 Thus, a major point of convergence of energy and the environment concerns whether or not environmental regulations affect the market entry of various energy
producers. In turn, the interaction of energy and the environment directly affects the shape of energy policy. Nevertheless, these two
regulatory regimes tend to focus on and emphasize different elements.
The language of energy law and policy, for example, focuses on
short term gains, economic efficiency, capital investment, return on
investment, shareholder concerns and the like.3 Energy industries, for

† Dean Emeritus and the Wilbert & Helen Ziegler Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law; Scholar, Center for Progressive Regulation.
1. Current casebooks and textbooks on energy law and policy connect energy and environmental laws and policies and usually do so through economics. See, e.g., FRED BOSSELMAN
ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2000); ENERGY LAW GROUP,
ENERGY LAW AND POLICY FOR THE 21 CENTURY (2000); MARLA MANSFIELD, THE REEL
WORLD: CASES AND MATERIALS ON RESOURCES, ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
(2001).
2. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 41-47.
3. See, e.g., Sam Kalen, Replacing a National Energy Policy with a National Resource Policy, 19 Nat. Resource & Envt’l 9 (2005); AMORY B. LOVINS, SOFT ENERGY PATHS: TOWARD A
DURABLE PEACE 26-31 (1977).
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the most part, are old, large, established, and politically influential.4 In
fact, the dominant model of energy policy in the United States con5
sists of large-scale, capital intensive, and mostly fossil fuel industries.
The language of the environment is distinct from that of energy.
Resource preservation, conservation, stewardship, long-term protection and the like are the stock and trade variables of environmental6
ists. To the extent that there is an alternative energy policy in the
United States which relies on clean and renewable energy sources, its
contribution to the production of energy has been minimal. For most
of the last half century, alternative energy resources have never accounted for more than 3% of our energy economy.7 To the extent that
there are alternative energy producers, those producers tend to be
small entrepreneurs who do not yet exercise significant political influence.8 The significance and influence of alternative energy policies
and alternative producers is changing, however, as a result of increased concerns about the harsh consequences of global warming
and climate change.9 Still, there exists a gap in our thinking and in our
conversations about the relationships between energy and the environment, a gap reflected in policy and regulation. This Symposium
presents an opportunity to discuss closing that gap by asking whether
or not environmental regulations adversely affect energy markets.
The Symposium is timely because it comes at a critical period in
the domestic and international conversation about the energy future.
Over 30 years ago, the United Nations published a report urging governments to develop “sustainable societies” that would allow economic (and, therefore, energy) growth while protecting the environment.10 Since that report, the United Nations has held two Earth

4. See Cheney v. United States Dist. Ct., 124 S. Ct. 2576 (2004). The underlying complaint
in that case was that the National Energy Policy Development Group, which wrote the Bush
Administration’s National Energy Policy, infra note 14, under the leadership of Vice President
Cheney, was comprised of traditional energy industry representative such as Kenneth Lay of
Enron and was devoid of environmental representation.
5. Joseph P. Tomain, The Dominant Model of United States Energy Policy, 61 U. COL. L.
REV. 355 (1990).
6. See, e.g., LOVINS, supra note 3, at 38-46; WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987).
7. DOE ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 276
(2003) [hereinafter Annual Energy Review 2003].
8. See, e.g., VIJAY V. VAITHEESWARAN, POWER TO THE PEOPLE (2003); LOVINS, supra
note 3, at ch. 1.
9. See infra notes 68-78 and accompanying text.
10. The concept of “sustainable development” was introduced at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972. The idea was further developed in
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Summits addressing sustainable development—one in Rio de Janeiro
11
12
in 1992 and the second in Johannesburg in 2002. Domestically, the
National Energy Polices of the Clinton13 and Bush14 Administrations
have paid lip service to the concept of sustainable development but
nothing of note has come from those policies. Today, however, bipartisan thinking about energy and the environment is more visible.
Shortly after this Symposium, for example, the William J. Clinton
Presidential Foundation hosted a forum entitled New Thinking on
Energy Policy: Meeting the Challenges of Security, Development, and
Climate Change.15 The Clinton Conference brought together international business and government leaders to discuss the global future of
energy. The title of the conference captures the necessity of linking
energy and the environment and, significantly, of linking both to matters of security. Two days later, on December 8, 2004, the Bipartisan
National Commission on Energy Policy issued a major study entitled
Ending the Energy Stalemate16 which also emphasizes the intercon-

UNITED NATIONS WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR
COMMON FUTURE (1987). This Report, also know as the “Brundtland Commission Report,”
after its Chair, Prime Minister Gro Brundtland of Norway, defined “sustainable development”
as meeting the “needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs.” Id. at 8.
11. For information about the Rio Earth Summit, see http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/
enviro.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2005).
12. For information on the Johannesburg Earth Summit, see http://www.earthsummit
2002.org (last visited Mar. 9, 2005).
13. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, SUSTAINABLE
AMERICA: A NEW CONSENSUS FOR THE FUTURE (1996). See also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY, NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY PLAN (July, 1995); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY,
STRATEGIC PLAN: PROVIDING AMERICA WITH ENERGY SECURITY, NATIONAL SECURITY,
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, SCIENCE LEADERSHIP (Sept. 1997); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY, COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGY (Apr. 1998).
14. NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY DEVELOPMENT GROUP, NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY ch.
3 (May 2001) [hereinafter National Energy Policy], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
energy/National-Energy-Policy,pdf
15. A video of the Forum can be found at http://www.clintonfoundation.org/featureenergy-1206041.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2005).
16. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON ENERGY POLICY, ENDING THE ENERGY STALEMATE: A
BIPARTISAN STRATEGY TO MEET AMERICA’S ENERGY CHALLENGES (Dec. 2004) [hereinafter
National Commission Report]. This Commission has been criticized by Public Citizen for being
too industry oriented and not bipartisan enough; see http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/
release.cfm?ID=1837 (Dec. 8, 2004). A year earlier, the Energy Future Coalition, another
bipartisan group of energy leaders and thinkers published a similar report, ENERGY FUTURE
COALITION, CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY: CHARTING A NEW ENERGY FUTURE (June
2003) [hereinafter Energy Future Coalition], available at http://www.energyfuturecoalition.org/
full_report/index.shtm.
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nectedness of energy, the environment, the economy, and security at
the national and international levels.
Clearly, recent events indicate a notable shift in thinking about
energy policy, a shift that pays more attention to environmental impacts and geopolitical realities than before. My topic, nuclear power,
is a central actor in this emerging drama. When first asked to participate in this Symposium, my initial response to the question “Do environmental regulations affect new market entry by nuclear power producers?” was — “No. Environmental regulations have no effect on
new entrants because the nuclear power industry has been moribund
for nearly three decades and market investments have simply dried
17
up.” I could have very easily given the exact opposite answer and
said: “Yes. Environmental regulations have completely precluded
new nuclear power entrants because without an answer to the problem of nuclear waste disposal there will be no new nuclear plants
coming on line.”18 Both statements are true.
Economics and environmental concerns affect the market entry
of nuclear power. Curiously though, heightened concerns about climate change are beginning to renew interest in nuclear power. The
Article proceeds to describe possible nuclear futures and discusses
what is necessary for market entry for new nuclear plants. Part I
places the nuclear power industry and its regulation in its historical
context. This section will identify the core issues that surround the future of nuclear power. Part II engages in a thought experiment regarding the costs and benefits of nuclear power and its alternatives.
This Part of the Article establishes the key variables necessary for an
expansion of nuclear power. Part III presents three alternative nu17. See, e.g., PIETRO S. NIVOLA, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN THE
UNITED STATES, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION POLICY BRIEF NO. 138 (2004) (“In America, it is
safe to say, the halt [in the nuclear industry] has to do with basic economic considerations, not
just political obstacles. . . . In the teeth of inauspicious market conditions, even the additional
government intervention that was envisioned in last year’s omnibus energy bill would not suffice
to entice skeptical investors in the near term.”).
18. See National Commission Report, supra note 16,at 58(“Even with success in the cost
and safety challenges, a new generation of nuclear reactors is unlikely to be built in the United
States unless and until nuclear plant owners (largely electric utilities) and the public are persuaded that the government is able to meet its obligation, under existing law, to take possession
of and adequately sequester the highly radioactive spent fuel from reactor operations.”). See
also JOHN DEUTCH & ERNEST J. MONIZ (CO-CHAIRS), THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR POWER: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY MIT STUDY ix (2003) [hereinafter MIT Study]. The MIT Study argues that
“high-level waste can safely be disposed of in geologic repositories . . . . We note, however, that
among the general public, and even among some in the technical community, there is a lack of
confidence in the prospects for successful technical and organizational implementation of the
geologic disposal concept.” Id. at 54.
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clear power futures from which policy makers must choose. The Article concludes by suggesting what the immediate future holds in store
for commercial nuclear energy.
I. THE SITUATION OF NUCLEAR POWER
A. The State of the Industry
The United States energy picture can be divided roughly between oil and electricity, each accounting for about 50 percent of the
19
energy consumption in the country. The electricity market can be
divided again with coal accounting for 50 percent of electricity generation and nuclear power accounting for 20 percent, followed by
natural gas at 18 percent with the remainder accounted for by all
20
other resources including hydropower and other renewables.
The commercial nuclear power industry began with a small 60
21
megawatt reactor at Shippingsport, Pennsylvania in 1957. Today,
22
there are 104 nuclear power plants in the country. Those plants,
however, have been operating for some time. No new nuclear power
plants have come online since 1978 and all plants ordered since 1973
have been canceled.23 Thus, it is more than fair to say that the nuclear
power industry in this country has been moribund for 30 years after
what promised to be a nearly inexhaustible and cheap source of energy.24 A brief history of nuclear power and its regulation can highlight this dormancy.
B. A Nano-History of Nuclear Power Regulation
Our country, indeed the world, has always viewed nuclear power
with fear and fascination. The very idea of fissionable atoms with
their consequent release of large magnitudes of energy has been
wrapped up with thoughts of both war and peace which continue to
intrigue us.

19.
20.
21.
22.

Annual Energy Review 2003, supra note 7, at 3.
Id. at 222.
BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 944.
MARK HOLT & CARL E. BEHRENS, CRS ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS: NUCLEAR
ENERGY POLICY CRS-1 (Sept. 1, 2004).
23. Id.
24. The classic phrase, made by the first chair of the Atomic Energy Commission Lewis
Strauss, was that nuclear power would generate electricity “too cheap to meter.” See infra note
35 and accompanying text. See also STEVEN MARK COHN, TOO CHEAP TO METER: AN
ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF THE NUCLEAR DREAM 107 (1997).
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The story of atomic energy begins in earnest with the Manhattan
25
Project in Los Alamos, New Mexico during World War II under the
direction of General Leslie Groves and Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer.
The Los Alamos project was the world’s largest scientific undertaking
to that time.26 The first atomic bomb was exploded in Alamogordo,
New Mexico at Trinity Site in 1945.27 Upon seeing the mushroom
cloud of radioactive energy after that first experimental explosion
Oppenheimer commented: “Now I am become death, the destroyer
of worlds,” quoting the Bhagavad Gita.28 After Alamogordo, the
bombs were used to bring a conclusion to World War II with the de29
struction of Hiroshima and Nagasaka, Japan. Oppenheimer’s quotation strikes us as either odd or melodramatic given the fact that he
was the lead scientist on the Manhattan Project and was fully knowledgeable about the task at hand. Nevertheless, it captures the fear
and the fascination of nuclear energy that have gripped the world
since its inception. The first use of atomic power for belligerent purposes is of renewed concern today.
After WWII, the future of atomic energy was a matter of international realpolitik. The United States was concerned that other countries, most particularly the then Soviet Union, would acquire nuclear
weapons capacities. In order to maintain nuclear dominance, US government leaders believed that nuclear power had to be tightly con30
trolled and did so through the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. The 1946
Act established the Atomic Energy Commission, the predecessor
agency to today’s Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and invested all
control of nuclear power in the hands of the military with no civilian
involvement.31 Such control only intensified the concern that atomic
energy was to be used as the original weapon of mass destruction, yet
32
nuclear power promised so much. In particular, nuclear power could

25. Earlier, in 1942, the first successful fission experiment occurred at the University of
Chicago. This experiment was a prelude to Los Alamos because the same scientists were involved in both projects. See RICHARD RHODES, THE MAKING OF THE ATOMIC BOMB 399-401
(1986).
26. Id. See also Miguel A. Bracchini, The History and Ethics Behind the Manhattan Project
(Apr. 1997), available at http://www.me.utexas.edu/~uer/manhattan/.
27. RHODES, supra note 25, at 669-78.
28. Id. at 676.
29. Id. at 745 – 47.
30. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, 60 Stat. 755 (1946).
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., GEORGE T. MAZUZAN & J. SAMUEL WALKER, CONTROLLING THE ATOM:
THE BEGINNINGS OF NUCLEAR REGULATION 1946 – 1962 ch. 1 (1984).
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be used as a commercial energy source but the prevailing regulatory
scheme under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 precluded private ownership and commercial development.
In order to allay public concerns about nuclear power, President
Eisenhower began advocating the “Atoms for Peace Program,” most
notably in a speech he gave at the United Nations in December,
33
1953. Although the speech was benignly titled “Atoms for Peace,” it
concentrated on US concerns about weapons competition more than
about the need to move nuclear power away from military uses to
more peaceful uses. Also at that time, however, private industry was
lobbying to bring nuclear power onto the commercial stage because
of the great potential for profit. Industrial pressure for commercial
use and international competition and concern about arms control
contributed to the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.34 The
1954 Act completely changed the way the country did its nuclear
business, moving nuclear power into the hands of the private sector.
The movement was captured by Atomic Energy Commission Chairman, Lewis Strauss, when he said that privatization was good for the
country because electricity generated by nuclear power would be “too
cheap to meter.”35 The 1954 Act is largely the regulatory structure
which governs today. The Act promoted civilian ownership and
commercial development and thus began the private commercial
market.
There was, however, a significant market flaw in the nuclear
power industry which constituted a complete impediment to commercialization. Simply, nuclear liabilities were too costly for any private
entrepreneur to undertake, and the industry would not proceed without government support. Financial support came in the form of the
36
Price-Anderson Act of 1957, which limited the amount of liability a
utility or reactor manufacturer would incur in the event of a nuclear
37
accident. During the Price-Anderson Act hearings, a representative
of General Electric, one of the four key reactor manufacturers, said
33. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Address before the General Assembly of the United nations on
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, 1953 – 1960 813 – 822 (1960).
34. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (1954).
35. See JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, NUCLEAR POWER TRANSFORMATION 8 (1987); DANIEL
FORD, THE CULT OF THE ATOM 50 (1982).
36. Price-Anderson Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2000)).
37. James R. Curtis et al., Nuclear Power, in 2 DAVID J. MUCHOW & WILLIAM A. MOGEL,
ENERGY LAW & TRANSACTIONS §54.14 (2002)
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that GE would not “proceed with a cloud of bankruptcy hanging over
38
its head.” Similarly, Charles Weaver, the CEO of Westinghouse, another reactor manufacturer, said: “We knew at the time that all questions about ‘safety and risk’ weren’t answered. That’s why we fully
supported the Price-Anderson Liability Legislation. When I testified
before Congress, I made it perfectly clear that we could not proceed
as a private company without that kind of government backing.”39
Commercialization was given the financial assurance it needed, and
the Price-Anderson Act has continued to be reauthorized approximately every 10 years.40
The effect of the 1954 and 1957 legislation was quick and dramatic. Quite simply, utilities could not rush fast enough to order the
construction of nuclear power plants to become part of what they
imagined would be the electricity industry in the 21st Century. The
period between 1957 through the mid 1960’s was known as the Great
Band Wagon Market for the commercial nuclear power industry.41
Nuclear plants were the largest electric utilities operating until that
time and continue to be so through the present. From 1963 to 1969,
for example, the Atomic Energy Commission issued twenty-eight
construction permits for plants ranging from 800 to 1100 megawatts
which constitute the upper range of electric plant.42 During this great
construction period, nuclear generated electricity ultimately became
43
one-fifth of all electricity production. As active, optimistic, and aggressive as the Great Band Wagon Market was, the concert ended
44
dramatically with the accident at Three Mile Island in 1979. Depending upon how one reads history, Three Mile Island was either as close

38.
39.
40.
41.

TOMAIN, supra note 35, at 8 – 9.
Id. at 9.
Curtis et al., supra note 37, at §54.14[1] [c] & [d].
J. SAMUEL WALKER, CONTAINING THE ATOM: NUCLEAR REGULATION IN A
CHANGING ENVIRONMENT, 1963-1971 ch. 2 (1992). See also MARK HERTSGAARD, NUCLEAR
INC. 44 (1983).
42. WALKER, supra note 41, at 34.
43. Annual Energy Review 2003, supra note 7, at xxxii (describing nuclear power is equal to
20% of electricity produced).
44. See PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND, THE
NEED FOR CHANGE: THE LEGACY OF TMI (1979) (also known as the Kemeny Commission Report). See generally J. SAMUEL WALKER, THREE MILE ISLAND: A NUCLEAR CRISIS IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2004).
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to a core meltdown as a reactor can get,45 or a cautionary tale about
46
the development of the industry.
This brief history demonstrates two salient points about nuclear
power. First, the private sector successfully galvanized significant political support and endorsement for generating electricity with nuclear
power. This private sector interest coincided with national interests
and both wanted US control and US market domination of nuclear
power. The second and persistently troubling point about nuclear
power is that it does not operate in a workable market. Financially,
nuclear power does not function without government support. In the
beginning, there would have been no Great Band Wagon Market
without Price-Anderson protection.
After Three Mile Island, however, another gross market flaw
reared its head. To that time, government policymakers had not paid
sufficient attention to the back-end of the fuel cycle and had not regulated for permanent radioactive waste disposal. For it was not until
1982, with the passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act,47 that the major environmental consequence of nuclear waste was addressed legislatively. Nuclear power, although carbon-free, is not free from environmental impact.
C. The Nuclear Fuel Cycle and the Environment
Commercial nuclear power can be divided into three stages—the
front-end of the fuel cycle; the operational phase of the fuel cycle; and
the back-end of the fuel cycle. There are environmental consequences
at each stage and there are regulations to address those consequences.
The front-end of the fuel cycle involves the mining and milling of
uranium as well uranium enrichment and fabrication. During the mining and milling phases, radiation hazards are low but are not nonexistent. Mill tailings, the remains of the mining process, contain radon which is environmentally hazardous and carcinogenic. These hazards are addressed in the Uranium Mill Tailings and Radioactive
48
Control Act of 1978. After the uranium ore is mined, it is then
milled, which is the process of taking the ore and converting it into
45. See, e.g., DANIEL F. FORD, THREE MILE ISLAND: THIRTY MINUTES TO MELTDOWN
(1982).
46. NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE, THE TMI 2 ACCIDENT: ITS IMPACT, ITS LESSONS (Mar.
2004), available at http://www.nei.org/doc.asp?catnum=3&catid=294.
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101 – 10226 (2000).
48. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7901 – 42 (2000).
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uranium oxide, a substance commonly referred to as “yellow cake.”49
The yellow cake is then converted into gaseous uranium hexafluoride,
which allows for an enrichment process to raise the concentration of
uranium from non-fissionable U238 to U235, which is a uranium enriched
50
isotope capable of causing the necessary chain reaction. Once the
enrichment has taken place, the gas is returned to a solid state and
fashioned into uranium pellets which are about the size of pencil
erasers.51 Those pellets are then fashioned into the fuel rods used in
reactors to create nuclear fission.52 The enrichment and fabrication
phases create radioactive hazards that are also addressed by the Ura53
nium Mill Tailings Act.
The operational phase of the fuel cycle entails the use of the uranium produced by the front end of the cycle. Uranium has several
uses, including hospital uses for x-rays, weapons production, and electricity generation. While hospital use generates low-level waste regulated by the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act
54
of 1985, this Article concentrates on electricity generation. Electric
utilities must address a range of environmental matters including
plant-siting, onsite waste disposal of spent fuel, and off-site waste disposal.55 Plant siting can have environmental impacts on surrounding
land and particularly water, which is used for cooling purposes. The
cooling process draws water from nearby streams and returns warmer
water to them, affecting fish and other aquatic life. This process and
its effects are addressed in detail by federal regulations.56
The disposal of nuclear waste, however, is a larger problem. As
noted above, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA) addresses permanent waste disposal.57 The central problem with nuclear
waste is that it is radioactive and, therefore, carcinogenic, and this radioactivity persists for thousands of years. The NWPA authorized a
process to find a safe depository for permanent disposal; and the contentious site selection process concluded by identifying Yucca Mountain in Nevada as the final location, after numerous court challenges

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

WALKER, supra note 41, at 23.
Id.
Id.
Id.
42 U.S.C. §§ 7914, 7918 (2000).
42 U.S.C. §§2 021(b)-(j) (2000).
10 C.F.R. pt. 51 (2004).
Id.
See Nuclear Waste Policy Act, supra note 47.
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and Congressional interventions.58 Yucca Mountain was scheduled to
begin operation, but the most recent environmental challenge has
prompted the D.C. Circuit to order a reconsideration of the safety of
Yucca Mountain.59 To date there is no place for final disposal of spent
fuel. Instead, spent fuel is stored at the site of the nuclear reactor and
60
those sites are given extended licenses until this matter is resolved.
The back-end of the fuel cycle also evokes major environmental
61
concerns, comprising on-site waste disposal, plant decommissioning
62
and license renewal. The lack of a permanent disposal site is causing
on-site waste disposal facilities to expand, and these expansions present environmental and safety concerns. The major environmental issue surrounding plant decommissioning is the radioactivity contained
63
in the debris, and its transportation and disposal. Furthermore, license renewals are occurring with greater frequency than expected.
Once, it was contemplated that nuclear plants would operate for
about 40 years.64 Today, however, those estimates are being extended
to 60 years65 through license renewals in order to keep the plants operating.66 Extended plant life raises safety and environmental concerns because of the longer lifespan of the plants. In short, the nuclear
industry is affected by a wide range of environmental regulations that
trace the full nuclear fuel cycle.

58. See generally Ralph Ofierski, Environmental Quality: Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 22
ENVTL. L. 1145 (1992).
59. See Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The
court ruled that the Environmental Protection Agency could not rely on an estimate of 10,000
years of safety because the Energy Policy Act of 1992 required the EPA to follow the recommendation of the National Academy of Sciences which recommended a 1-million-year estimate.
60. See id. (stating that currently, Yucca Mountain has not been approved as a waste disposal site).
61. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Consolidated NMSS Decommissioning Guidance
NUREG-1757 (2003). See also 10 C. F. R. pts. 50.75, 50.82, 51.53 & 51.95 (2004).
62. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, NUREG-1437 (1999).
63. See, e.g., US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants
(Jan. 2004) (decommissioning); 42 U.S.C. § 10175 (2000): 10 C.F. R. § 71 (2004) (transportation).
64. Union of Concerned Scientists, U.S. Nuclear Plants in the 21st Century: The Risk of A
Lifetime 21 (May 2004).
65. Id. at 3.
66. National Energy Policy, supra note 14, at 5-17.

081505 TO M AIN .D O C

232

11/14/2005 4:38 PM

D U K E EN V IRO N M EN TA L LA W & PO LICY FO RU M

[V ol.15:221

D. Contemporary Concerns
Brief descriptions of the nuclear power industry and its regulation reveal the key variables that affect nuclear policy past, present,
and future. The fear of nuclear power has been that it can be used as
a weapon of mass destruction with long-term consequences. After
Three Mile Island, concern rose about the so-called China Syndrome,
in which a reactor melts through the floor of the containment vessel
and into the earth, figuratively finding its way to China with consequent releases of heat and radioactivity polluting air, water, and
67
land. Our fascination with nuclear power is the very idea that out of
the atom can come massive amounts of energy that can be used not
only for weapons but can be used to chill our beer, light our homes,
and run our computers.
Today, anyone thinking about a nuclear future must consider the
following:
•
•
•
•
•

68

Will the public accept a renewal of nuclear power?
Are reactors safe after Three Mile Island?
Is nuclear electricity cheaper than electricity generated by
other sources?
How will nuclear waste be disposed?
How should we think about catastrophic incidents including
weapons proliferation, climate change, and terrorist strikes at
nuclear facilities?

In short, future nuclear policy must consider energy, the economy,
the environment, and domestic and international security. The next
section will put all those variables into a rough equation, but until
each of those questions can be answered with some degree of comfort, there will be no commercial nuclear future.
II. FUNDAMENTAL CHOICE AND THE BIG COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
The future of nuclear power will depend on two inter-related decisions — one private and one public. At some point, private utility
investors must decide whether or not to commit financial resources to
nuclear power. Public policymakers, similarly, must decide whether to
commit public resources to nuclear power. Recall that nuclear power

67. See J. SAMUEL WALKER, THREE MILE ISLAND 54 (2004).
68. See MIT Study, supra note 18, at ch. 9.
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does not operate in a workably competitive market. Instead, the industry has always relied on government support. Without government, there would be no commercial nuclear power industry. Although these investment decisions are not identical,69 both rely on
rough calculations, and for illustrative purposes, I will set out the calculations in three equations.
At its most basic, the decision must made be as to whether or not
the benefits of nuclear power outweigh its costs as depicted in Equation 1:
(1) B > C
Essentially, policy makers and investors must decide that electricity generated from nuclear power will be less costly than electricity
generated from other sources. We can use two fossil fuels, coal and
natural gas, as comparative examples for this purpose.
In this regard, then, the first equation can be modified to show
that a private investment decision (I) will be made when a megawatt
of electricity from nuclear power (MwhN) is cheaper than a megawatt
of electricity from fossil fuel power (MwhFF):
(1a) I = MwhN < MwhFF
Next, investors must cost out a megawatt hour of electricity from
both nuclear power and from fossil fuels. In this regard, the megawatt
hour cost of nuclear power comprises: fuel costs (FC), construction
costs (CC), operating costs (OC), waste disposal costs (WD), clean air
costs (AC), global warming costs (GW), and other environmental
costs (OE) such as environmental costs due to mill tailings, site
preparation and degradation, water use effects on fish and aquatic life
and the like. Thus, a megawatt hour of nuclear power can be represented in Equation 2:
(2) MwhN = (FC + CC+ OC + WD + CA + GW + OE)N

69. Private decision makers concentrate on return on investment and short-term gains for
shareholders. Public decision makers should concentrate on the longer-term, public risk, safety
and the cost of nuclear power. This broader focus, however, is not always the case. See, e.g.,
David Lochbaum, Nuclear Plant Risk Studies: Failing the Grade 2 (Aug. 2000) (arguing that Nuclear Regulatory Commission risk assessments undervalue the potential consequences of nuclear accidents in their calculations.)
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Similarly, a megawatt hour of fossil fuel power contains the same
variables:
(2a) MwhFF = (FC + CC + OC + WD + CA + GW + OE)FF
In the end, these two formulas must be compared. And, again, a
private investment will be made in nuclear power when nuclear generated electricity is cheaper that fossil fuel generated electricity:
(2b) MwhN = (FC + CC + OC + WD + CA + GW + OE)N <
MwhFF = (FC + CC + OC + WD + CA + GW + OE)FF
The difference between the costs of a megawatt hour of nuclear
power and a megawatt hour of fossil fuel power can be considered the
benefit side of the equation. As such, these equations look like a
chain of simple additive variables. Yet, these cost equations are more
algorithmic, given the complexity of some of the variables such as
waste disposal and clean air costs. Nevertheless, deriving the cheaper
price of electricity does not end even with those calculations because
the cost side of the equation must be calculated as well. The variables
become even more complex and greater uncertainties are introduced
when total costs (TC) are examined. According to Judge Richard
Posner:
“Nuclear energy . . . is fully clean. But it is no panacea, because it is
much costlier than power generation by plants that burn coal or
natural gas, because of the difficulty of disposing of radioactive
wastes, because of the danger of a catastrophic meltdown . . . because of the risk of terrorist’s obtaining fissionable materials . . .
70
and because of public fears . . .”

Total costs, considered below in Equation 3, are especially important because public investments will be made only when the total
cost of nuclear power is less than the total cost of fossil fuel power.
Total costs include assessing the cost of catastrophic incidents (CI)
surrounding nuclear power and there are three catastrophic incidents
that must be considered. The first catastrophic incident is a core melt
71
down or other reactor accident. This is the type of safety issue in-

70. RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 51-52 (2004)
71. See CONSTANCE PERIN, SHOULDERING RISK: THE CULTURE OF CONTROL IN THE
NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY (2005).
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volved with Three Mile Island. The second catastrophic incident is
72
the risk of a terrorist attack on a nuclear installation. The third incident concerns nuclear weapons proliferation and is more likely to involve the removal of uranium from a weapons facility rather than an
electric utility.73
Such concerns about catastrophic incidents give pause to potential investors as well as to policymakers. These costs are part of the
nuclear investment equation and the costs of a catastrophic incident
must be discounted by the probability (P) that it will happen. Therefore, the total cost (TC) side of the equation is as follows:
(3) TC = (CI1 x P) + (CI2 x P) + (CI3 x P)
Each catastrophic incident is comprised of fatalities (F), injuries
(I), property damage (PD) and we can add psychological harms as
well (Psy).74
(3a) CI = F + I + PD + Psy
It thus remains, then, to calculate the probability of each catastrophic incident which leads us into the unknown. There is no reliable
way to calculate the probability of a terrorist attack or of pilfered
75
weapons grade uranium making its way into unfriendly hands. Various probabilities have been estimated for reactor accidents as follows:

72. See GRAHAM ALLISON, NUCLEAR TERRORISM: THE ULTIMATE PREVENTABLE
CATASTROPHE (2004).
73. See, e.g., William J. Broad & David E. Sanger, As Nuclear Secrets Emerge, More Are
Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2004, at 1 (reporting the finding by US and International Atomic
Energy Agency experts on the finding of blueprints for a 10-kiloton atomic bomb in the files of
the Libyan weapons program.) The report also suspected that this information was the result of
a deal made by a rogue nuclear weapons trafficker Dr. A.Q. Khan. See id. The story quotes an
American expert as saying “[t]his was the first time we had ever seen a loose copy of a bomb
design that clearly worked . . . and the question was: Who else had it? The Iranians? The Syrians? Al Qaeda?” See id.
74. The courts have not been overly solicitous of claims of psychological harms. See Metro.
Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983) (holding that the NRC is not
required to evaluate potential psychological impacts when evaluating environmental impacts of
proposed nuclear site); Matthew D. Adler, Fear Assessment: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Pricing of Fear and Anxiety, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=466720 (Nov. 2004); Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1119 (2002) (book review).
75. POSNER, supra note 70, at 174.
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(3b) P = 1 :: 20,000 r/y
1 :: 10,000 r/y
1 :: 22 y
During the heyday of nuclear power, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission estimated that the chance of a core meltdown was 1
chance in 20,000 reactor years (r/y).76 In other words, the NRC estimated that given 20,000 years of reactor life there was one possibility
of a serious reactor accident. Since there are about 100 reactors then
there is a chance that once in 200 years a reactor accident would occur. At the time, the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) criticized
the NRC Reactor Study and estimated the chance of an accident at
1:10,000 or once in 100 years,77 and UCS criticism continues to this
day.78 These probabilities can be compared with historic experience
insofar as the Three Mile Island incident, a serious loss of coolant accident which could have led to a core meltdown, occurred just 22
years after the first commercial nuclear reactor was brought online in
1957. Estimating meltdown probabilities is, at bottom, a guessing
game, but policymakers continue their modeling, with some growing
historic experience to assist them.79
Once the probabilities are calculated, then the total costs of nuclear power and fossil fuel power must be compared:
(3c) [(CI1 x P) + (CI2 x P) + (CI3 x P)]N < [(CI1 x P) + (CI2 x P)
+(CI3 x P)]FF
Or, more simply:
(3d) TCN < TCFF

76. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Reactor Safety Study WASH-1400 (Oct. 1975);
Severe Accident Risks, NUREG-1150 (Dec. 1990); Individual Plant Examination Program,
NUREG-1560 (Dec. 1997). These reports calculate risk as 5 events in 100,000 r/y which is the
same as 1 event in 20,000 r/y.
77. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, THE RISKS OF NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS: A
REVIEW OF THE NRC REACTOR SAFETY STUDY WASH -1400 (NUREG-75/014) 135 (1977) (on
file with THE DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM).
78. Lochman, supra note 69, at 12.
79. See MIT Study, supra note 18, at ch. 6 (comparing probabilistic risk assessment with
historic experience). See also US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Use of Risk In Nuclear Regulation, at http://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/regulatory/rulemaking/risk-informed.html (last updated Feb. 7, 2005)
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This last equation brings up back to where we started. Investments will be made in nuclear power when B > C, or when the greater
efficiency in electricity production outweighs the perceived risk of catastrophe. These equations are intended to be illustrative only and
80
take the form of a rough cost-benefit analysis. Hopefully, the point
has been made that the nuclear future depends not only on private
investment considerations of the sort that individual investors make
all of the time. The nuclear future also depends on gross assumptions,
rough estimates, and the valuation of imponderables as well as uncertainties affecting the public at large. Any nuclear future depends on
such cost-benefit assessments made by public and private actors.
III. ALTERNATIVE FUTURES
Assessing the most likely future for nuclear power depends upon
the question posed. An obvious, but incomplete, question is: “What is
the future of nuclear power?” Answering this specific question leads
to discussion of two alternative policies. The first alternative, the
Promotional Nuclear Policy, is driven by concerns about climate
change caused by fossil fuel emissions. This alternative emphasizes
the use of nuclear power over coal to generate electricity. The second
alternative, the Precautionary Nuclear Policy, focuses on safety including the disposal of radioactive wastes and the avoidance of the
various nuclear catastrophes. This alternative emphasizes coal over
nuclear power. Both alternatives accept the dominant model of energy policy with its reliance on large-scale, capital-intensive energy
producers.

80. Cost-benefit analysis is much more complicated and it is necessary to calculate a series
of additional variables including the value of a life, as well as the discount rates to be applied on
both sides of the equation among many others. There is a large literature dealing with the uses
and abuses of cost-benefit analysis and I will refer the reader to some of the more prevalent
scholarship. For a general introduction to the methodology see, E.J. MISHAN, COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS: AN INFORMAL INTRODUCTION (3d ed. 1982); DAVID L. WEINER & AIDAN R.
VINING, POLICY ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1992). For favorable scholarship
toward cost-benefit analysis, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE
OF REGULATORY PROTECTION (2002); RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (2002); COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL
PERSPECTIVES (Matthew D. Adler & Eric Posner eds., 2001) (largely favorable); POSNER, supra
note 70. For critical scholarship, see BARUCH FISCHHOFF, THE ART OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS (1977); Mark Sagoff, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (1988); Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004); Joseph P.Tomain. Junk Economics, 94 GEO. L. J. ___ (forthcoming 2005) (reviewing PRICELESS).
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A differently posed question, such as: “What is the future of energy policy?” reveals a third alternative. This broader question challenges the dominant model and suggests that clean, renewable energy
can play a larger role in the future that it does today and can provide
an alternative to nuclear power. This third alternative is called the
Smart Energy Policy.
A. Promotional Nuclear Policy
Support for nuclear power, at least according to industry81 and
occasional news stories,82 has been on the increase, and that support
has been recently fueled by two claims. First, nuclear power is an important alternative to carbon-based fuels, and second, nuclear power
can become cost competitive with those fuels. These claims of environmental protection and low cost electricity must, however, withstand close scrutiny.
The core environmental idea behind the Promotion Policy is well
stated in the National Commission Report which recommends that
government policies “improve the prospects for the expansion of nuclear energy” because of society’s interest “in abating climate-change
risks by expanding the share of no-carbon and low-carbon energy op83
tions in the electricity-generating mix . . . .” According to the National Commission Report, nuclear power accounts for nearly 70% of
84
the non-carbon part of domestic electricity generation.
This claim about environmental sensitivity enjoys international
and industry support as well. The Nuclear Energy Agency, a department within the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), sees the potential of nuclear power as part of a sustainable development program which promotes both energy and
economic development and environmental protection for both devel85
oped and developing countries. Similarly, the nuclear industry has

81. See, e.g., Nuclear Energy Institute, Energy Concerns Drive Record Public
Favorability for Nuclear Energy (June 2004).
82. See, e.g., Thor Vladmanis, Nuclear Power Slides Back Onto the Agenda, USA TODAY,
Sept. 27, 2004, at 1B; Alan Cowell, Britain Feeling Pressure for Power, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2004,
at B1.
83. National Commission Report, supra note 16, at 59.
84. Id. at 57.
85. See, e.g., Nuclear Energy Agency, Nuclear Energy in a Sustainable Development Perspective
(OECD
2000)available
at
http://w w w .nea.fr/htm l/ndd/docs/2000/nddsustdev.pdf(lastvisited M arch 4,2005).
Suffice it to say here that the concept is an expansive one and that in another version of sustainable development nuclear power may play no role. See Nuclear Energy Agency, Nuclear Energy
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also asserted the compatibility of nuclear power with a cleaner envi86
ronment through carbon-free electricity and emissions reductions.
To the extent that the Promotional Nuclear Policy is premised on
the need for non-carbon electricity generation, there is something odd
about United States energy policy. Global warming or climate change
is having a recognized impact on the world’s weather with hotter
summers, more tornados, melting Arctic and Antarctic regions and
87
more additional meteorological effect. More importantly, there is a
scientific consensus that human, or anthropogenic, activity is a con88
tributing factor to climate change. Regardless, the Bush Administration has ignored the prevailing scientific consensus about the anthropogenic contribution to global warming,89 has withdrawn the United
States from any further participation in the Kyoto Protocol, and has

and the Kyoto Protocol (OECD 2002) (arguing he nuclear power can help meet the green house
gas emissions goals of the Kyoto Protocol).
86. See, e.g., Nuclear Energy Institute, Powering the Future With Environmentally Sound
Nuclear Energy: The Ecological Stewardship of the Nuclear Energy Industry (2003) (“In 2000,
the nuclear energy sector accounted for 43 percent of the carbon reductions reported nationwide.” And, “Nuclear energy is by far the largest emission-free source of electricity in the
United States, accounting for three-quarters of all clean-air electricity.”). See also Nuclear Energy Institute, Meeting our Clean Air Needs With Emission-Free Generation: The Need for Nuclear Power, available at http://www.nei.org/documents/meetingneeds.pdf (last visited Mar. 9,
2005).
87. See, e.g., Ross Gelbspan, THE HEAT IS ON 5 – 8 (1997); Ross Gelbspan, Boiling Point
19 – 22, 33 – 36, 63 – 66, 87 – 92, 119 – 126, 147 – 151, 171 – 174 (2004). See also Jim Motavalli
(ed.), Feeling the Heat: Dispatches from the Frontlines of Climate Change (2004).)
88. The most notable organization in the world on global warming is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The IPCC is a joint effort of the World Meterological Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme and is open to all members of either organization. In its Third Assessment Report, the IPCC states clearly that “[c]oncentrations
of atomospheric greenhouse gases and their radiative forcing have continued to increase as a
result of human activities.” Summary for Policymakers: A Report of Working Group I of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 7, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/spm22-01.pdf
(last visited Dec. 19, 2004).
89. See, e.g., Larry Rohter, U.S. Waters Down Global Commitment to Curb Greehnouse
Gases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2004, at 6 (reporting that the United States “blocked efforts to begin more substantive discussions” about reducing carbon emission pursuant to the Kyoto Protocol and “stood virtually alone in challenging the scientific assumptions underlying the Kyoto
Protocol” of which the U.S. is not a part.). For other references regarding the Bush Administration’s intransigence regarding the anthropogenic causes of global warming see Robert S. Devine, Bush Versus the Environment 174-79 (2004); Jim Motavalli (ed.), Feeling the Heat: Dispatches From the Frontlines of Climate Change 7-8 (2004); Carl Pope & Paul Rauber, Strategic
Ignorance: Why the Bush Administration is Recklessly Destroying a Century of Environmental
Progress ch. 10 (2004); Ross Gelbspan, Boiling Point 41-61 (2004).
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instead initiated two clean coal programs,90 neither of which have
made any measurable contribution to emission reductions.
In addition to environmental protection, the Promotional Nuclear Policy claims that nuclear power is (or can become) cost competitive with fossil fuel electricity precisely because of the difficulties
with fossil fuel emissions and, therefore, nuclear power should play a
91
larger role in the future. The Bush Administration’s National Energy
Policy, in this regard, argues that nuclear plants are safer, better operated, and cost competitive with other fuels.92 These claims have
some, but not complete, merit. The United States has experienced no
nuclear incident of the magnitude of Three Mile Island since that
event. Nevertheless, safety problems persist.93 The operating cost of
generating electricity from old nuclear plants is cost competitive with
electricity from coal or natural gas but that is only because the construction costs have already been recouped in the rate base.94 The real
cost of new nuclear plants, which must account for construction costs,
95
is not cost competitive with alternative fossil fuels. There is also evidence that nuclear plants are becoming better managed, thus lowering costs, as managers gain in experience, and as utility consolidations
concentrate that expertise.96 At the same time, however, universities

90. The Clear Skies Initiative: Executive Summary available at http://whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2002/02/print/clear-skies.html (Feb. 2002); Global Climate Change Initiative, available at
http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/print/20020214.html (Feb. 2002). See also
Department of Energy, Clean Coal Power Initiative (CCPI) available at http://www.fossil.
energy.gov/programs/powersystems/cleancoal/ccpi/Prog052_4P.pdf (Sept. 2004); Vision 21
Program Plan: Clean Energy Plants for the 21st Century (Apr. 1999), available at
http://fossil.energy.gov/programs/powersystems/vision21/index.html (last updated Nov. 30,
2004).
91. See, e.g., David A. Repka & Kathryn M. Sutton, The Revival of Nuclear Power Plant
Licensing, 19 NAT. RESOURCES & ENVT’L. 39 (2005).
92. National Energy Policy, supra note 14, at 5-15, 5-16.
93. See e.g., John Sullivan, Restarting a Reactor with a Flawed Part, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,
2004, at 33 (reporting the utility’s desire to restart the Salem nuclear power plant in New Jersey
in face of an internal engineering report that a critical pump’s steel drive shaft was probably
cracked and could cause an accident.)
94. See VAITHEESWARAN, supra note 8, at 280. Operating costs for nuclear plants are
lower than those for coal and natural gas. “. . . America’s nuclear plants cranked out power during the winter of 2000-2001 at an operating cost of just 1.8 cents per kilowatt-hour. Coal plants
produced it for 2.1 cents per kW-hour, while those using natural gas . . . managed only 3.5 cents
per kW-hour.” Id.
95. Construction costs for nuclear power exceed those for coal and natural gas. See Scully
Capital, Business Case for New Nuclear Power Plants (July 2002) available at
http://www.scullycapital.com. See also infra note 100 and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., Jad Mouawad & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Biggest Utility in New Jersey Seen as
Target of Acquisition, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2004, at B1; Dennis K, Berman & John R.
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are turning out fewer trained nuclear engineers to become those
97
managers. Still, the current National Energy Policy favors the promotion of nuclear power by increasing the power ratings of existing
plants, continuing to re-license plants, continuing support for the
Price-Anderson Act, and providing tax breaks for decommissioning.98
A recent study conducted at the University of Chicago regarding
the future of nuclear power has been touted by the Department of
Energy as demonstrating that nuclear power is cost competitive with
99
100
coal and natural gas. The University of Chicago Study does not
bear out that claim as it analyzes a future energy scenario which compares the cost of electricity among nuclear power, coal, and natural
gas. The Chicago Study uses what it terms the “levelized cost of electricity” (LCOE) which includes operating and annualized capital
costs. The LCOE is used to compare the cost of nuclear generated
electricity with electricity generated by coal and natural gas. Despite
the DOE headline, the Chicago Study reveals that without new promotional policies, nuclear power goes lacking.101 The Study further
notes that, even under the most favorable circumstances, nuclear
102
power is more expensive than either coal or natural gas.
In order to make nuclear power cost competitive with either coal
or natural gas, government financial support is necessary. The Chicago Study argues that through a combination of government loan
guarantees, accelerated depreciation, investment tax credits, and production tax credits, together with some aggressive assumptions about
Emshwiller, Exelon Discuses Deal With PSEG, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2004, at A3; Eric Dash,
Exelon Plans to Buy New Jersey Utility, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2004, at C2 (reporting the potential acquisition of New Jersey’s largest utility P.S.E.&G. by the Exelon Corporation an owner of
a number of electric utilites and an experienced manager of nuclear plants). See also
VAITHEESWARAN, supra note 8, at 280.
97. VAITHEESWARAN, supra note 8, at 288.
98. National Energy Policy Development Group, National Energy Policy 5-15 to 5-17 (May
2001).
99. DOE Press Release, University of Chicago, Nuclear Power Competitive with Coal &
Natural Gas (Sept. 20, 2004), available at http://www.doe.gov/engine/content.do?BT_
CODE=PR_PRESSRELEASES&TT_CODE=PRESSRELEASE&PUBLIC_ID=16684.
100. University of Chicago, The Economic Future of Nuclear Power (Aug. 2004)[hereinafter
Chicago Study].
101. Id. at 5-4.
102. Id. at 5-1 (“Given the capital cost range, the LCOE of new nuclear plants in the absence of policies is from $53 to $71 per MWh, with a 7-year construction time. The range is
lower at $47 to $62 per MWh with a 5-year construction time. Costs remains outside the range
of competitiveness with coal and gas, which have LCOE’s of $33 to $41 per MHw and $35 to $45
per MWh respectively.”).
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construction and management, nuclear power can become cost com103
petitive. The necessary financial support is significant. Production
tax credits alone could provide $6 billion to $19.5 billion to the nuclear industry.104 These tax credits were proposed in the energy legis105
lation that failed in Congress in 2003. More specifically, in that legislation, nuclear plant operators would be given 1.8 cents per kilowatt
hour of electricity generating capacity in new nuclear plants.106 The
Chicago Study concludes, however, by noting that “no single financial
policy alone can definitely be counted on to bring about nuclear competitiveness by 2015.”107 Another form of financial incentive is, in effect, a reverse subsidy, through which a carbon tax is levied on fossil
fuels for the purpose of making nuclear power cost competitive with
coal and natural gas as those prices rise.108 In addition to the financial
incentives listed in the Chicago Study, the federal government has
also been urged to assist the RDD&D — research, design, development, and demonstration — of new nuclear technologies such as advanced and standardized reactor designs at a suggested $2 billion over
the next ten years.109
According to the Chicago Study, these financial incentives will
only work if the construction period for new plants can be reduced to
five years, a feat which has never yet been realized in the construction
110
of nuclear power plants. In addition, the Study argues that before
nuclear power can be cost competitive, aggressive learning assumptions must be made.111 In particular, the study states that nuclear
power can be generated at $40 per Mwh with a 5-year construction

103. Id. at ch. 5.
104. See MIT Study, supra note 18, at 81 (recommending a production tax credit that would
result in a 200 million dollar subsidy per 1000 megawatt plant which amounts to about 2 billion
dollars paid out over several years).
105. Energy Policy Act 2003, H.R. 6, 108th Cong (2003).
106. See, e.g., Nuclear Information & Resource Service, The Energy Bill HR 6: A Gift that
Keeps on Taking, available at http://www.nirs.org/factsheets/productiontaxcredits.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2004).
107. Chicago Study, supra note 100, at 9-1.
108. See, e.g., MIT Study, supra note 18, at 78.
109. National Commission Report supra note 16, at 60. See also National Energy Policy, supra note 14, at 5-17.
110. Chicago Study, supra note 100, at 5-1. See generally JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, NUCLEAR
POWER TRANSFORMATION (1987).
111. The Chicago Study, supra note 100, also makes several financial assumptions about depreciation (§5.2.5); rates of return on equity (§5.3.3); rates of return on debt (§5.3.4); cost of
capital (§5.4.2.2); and, risk premium (§5.4.2.3) all of which can have dramatic consequences on
private investment decisions.
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assumption only after the fifth standardized plant is built.112 Cost reductions might also come from experience by reducing “first of a kind
engineering” (FOAKE) costs and by reducing “learning by doing”
costs. The Chicago Study goes on to note that “learning by doing will
reduce costs beyond first plants. It will make a contribution but by itself is not sufficient to safely ensure self-sufficient competitiveness.”113
FOAKE and learning by doing costs can be reduced if the “regulatory environment is stable, if the nuclear plant construction industry
is competitive, and if engineering teams and construction crews are
kept more or less continuously employed.”114
Regardless of the increase in Promotional Policy advocates, nuclear power will not reemerge as a new source of electricity production without government subsidies, aggressive assumptions about investments and construction, increased costs of generating electricity
by fossil fuels, and advances in nuclear technologies.115
B. Precautionary Nuclear Policy
The simplest way to define the precautionary principle is “better
116
safe than sorry.” Once regulators know that an “activity is likely to
harm people or the environment, [the precautionary] principle requires regulators to assume there is no safe level of human or environmental exposure to a harmful activity in the absence of reasonable
evidence that such a safe level exists.”117 Thus stated, the precautionary principle shifts the burden to the producers of the negative exter118
nalities of proving that harm is unlikely. The precautionary principle is particularly pertinent to public policy questions with the

112. The Chicago Study recognizes that the five-year assumption is ambitious particularly
considering that the Department of Energy bases its forecasting on a seven-year assumption,
Chicago Study supra note 100, at 5-17, 5-18.
113. Id. at 9-2.
114. Id. at 4-24. The Study goes on to report that costs reductions are more reasonably assumed “if the number of units that can be built at a single site is limited, and construction across
sites is discontinuous.”
115. Internationally, the Chinese government is pursuing an aggressive nuclear construction
program bringing on line two reactors a year between now and 2020. Even with such an aggressive construction program, nuclear power, which now accounts for 2% of China’s electricity
production, will only then account for 4% because of China’s growing demand. See Howard W.
French, China Promotes Another Boom: Nuclear Power, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2005, at A1.
116. FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 117 (2004).
117. A NEW PROGRESSIVE AGENDA FOR PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 31-32,
94-95 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Rena Steinzor eds., 2005).
118. Id. at 93-96.
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potential for catastrophic consequences, even when a scientific consensus is lacking and probabilities of occurrence are low. The princi119
ple enjoys application in international environmental regulations
120
but has been subject to criticism in the United States. The basis of
the criticism is that “safe is not necessarily better than sorry,” espe121
cially if efficiency and technological and scientific progress suffer.
Policy analysts who argue against expansion of nuclear power
use two arguments. The first argument is that nuclear power is simply
not cost competitive with other fuels. The second argument is that
safety and risk concerns still exist and, in fact, are of increasing con122
cern given the rise of terrorism in the world.
The Natural Resources Defense Counsel, by way of example,
123
“neither expects nor supports a nuclear power revival.” The NRDC
argues that nuclear plants are simply not cost competitive with other
sources of electricity generation. According to their study, cleaner alternatives such as energy efficiency, wind, biomass, and solar power
can be made operational sooner and more cheaply than nuclear
power.124 In addition, nuclear power is unattractive because of the risk
of weapons proliferation, unsafe reactor design, a too favorable PriceAnderson Act subsidy, and because there is still no operationally safe,
permanent waste depository.125
The Union of Concerned Scientists has for decades served as the
watchdog group over matters of reactor safety. Not surprisingly then,
their recent study concentrates on the safety features of nuclear
power and concludes that “[b]y failing to consistently enforce the
regulations, the NRC exposes millions of Americans to greater risk
126
than necessary.” The UCS argues that one must not think about the
safety of nuclear power plants in a linear way. Instead, safety assump119. See, e.g., ARIE TROUWBORST, EVOLUTION AND STATUS OF THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2002); Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development — Principle 15, available at http://www.unep.org/Documents/?DocumentID=
78&ArticleID=1163 (last visited Mar. 9, 2005).
120. See Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environment 17-21 (Oct. 2004)
(arguing that the precautionary principle is incoherent), available at http://www.law.uchicago.
edu/ Lawecon/index.html; POSNER, supra note 70, at 139 – 150.
121. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON 102-05 (2002).
122. See generally ALLISON, supra note 72.
123. Daniel Lashof & Patricio Silva, A Responsible Energy Policy for the 21st Century 18
(Mar. 2001).
124. Id. at 19.
125. Id. at 18 – 21.
126. David Lochbaum, U.S. Nuclear Plants in the 21st Century: The Risk of a Lifetime 2
(May 2004).
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tions must be made along what they term a “bathtub curve.”127 By this
term, the UCS means that risk starts high in the initial years of a
plants life as they are coming online, abating for a period of time until
the plant’s become older, during which time safety concerns increase.
In other words, for those advocates of nuclear power, their assertions
that plants are enjoying good safety records is true along the low flat
part of the bathtub curve, which is the part of the curve most plants
are experiencing today.128 Safety risks will increase, according to the
study, as nuclear plants age.129 The UCS then urges that NRC safety
inspections must be increased, as must public participation in the relicensing process. They argue, further, that risk analyses for nuclear
power are inadequate, and that if nuclear power is to be given a true
market test, then Price-Anderson Act protection must be eliminated,
at least for new plants. In other words, UCS takes the position that
nuclear power cannot pass a market test and, therefore, further subsidies in the face of safety concerns are not warranted. The UCS then
makes a series of recommendations, all aimed at improving NRC performance throughout the life cycle of a nuclear plant.130
The recent Massachusetts Institute of Technology study of the
future of nuclear power is also cautious, arguing that nuclear power
should be an option for reducing carbon emissions but at present
131
“[T]his is unlikely: nuclear power faces stagnation and decline.” The
MIT Study argues that for nuclear power expansion to succeed, several substantial hurdles must be cleared including:
•
•
•
•
•

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

nuclear power must become cost competitive with coal or
natural gas;
carbon emission credits can help nuclear power;
nuclear power must have improved safety through “best
practices” in construction and operation;
waste disposal issues must be satisfactory addressed;
international safeguards against proliferation must be maintained; and,

Id. at ch. 1.
Id. at ch. 3.
Id. at ch 4.
Id. at 9 – 10,17 – 18, 21 – 22.
MIT Study, supra note 18, at ix.
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nuclear power generation must be limited to once-through
132
fuel cycles rather than reprocessing.

The Precautionary Policy, thus, is skeptical about the future of
nuclear power. Nuclear does not appear to pass a market test, has increasing safety concerns, and does not have great promise for replacing fossil fuels. Presumably, if those hurdles are cleared, there can be
a nuclear future.
C. Smart Energy Policy
The third policy alternative—the Smart Energy Policy—is distinguishable from the Promotional Policy and from the Precautionary
Policy because the latter policies contemplate large-scale power producers and design their energy policies accordingly. The Smart Policy,
to the contrary, articulates an energy future that does not rely on the
dominant model, because that model is hazardous to our collective
133
health and to the health of the environment. Instead, the Smart Policy promotes small-scale, clean, renewable energy sources which are
more environmentally friendly and less prone to catastrophic incidents.134
More than twenty-five years after publication of Soft Energy
Paths, its author, Amory Lovins, is now being recognized as a serious
thinker and contributor to our energy future by a wide and bipartisan
group of energy policy actors.135 In Soft Energy Paths, as well as in
other publications, Lovins was clear about the utility of nuclear
136
power—he saw little usefulness for it. His great metaphor for nuclear generated electricity is that a nuclear power plant is nothing
other than a large tea kettle, and heating water for that kettle with

132. Reprocessing creates plutonium which is longer-lived, more dangerous, and more susceptible to weapons proliferation. This process is also know as a closed cycle and remains in disfavor across the board. MIT Study, surpa note 18, at ch. 4; Chicago Study supra note 100, at Appendix A5; ALLISION, dupra note 72, at ch. 7.
133. LOVINS, supra note 3, at chs. 1, 2, & 5.
134. Id.
135. Lovins has recently been referred to as the Sage of Snowmass by liberals and conservatives alike. See, e.g., President Reagan’s National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane, A Declaration of Energy Independence, Wall St. J., Dec. 20, 2004, at A15 (favorably reviewing Lovins
book Winning the Oil Endgame: Innovation for Profits, Jobs and Security ). See also
http://www.oilendgame.org and VAITHEESWARAN, supra note 8, at 13-16.
136. See, e.g., AMORY B. LOVINS & JOHN H. PRICE, NON-NUCLEAR FUTURES: THE CASE
FOR AND ETHICAL ENERGY STRATEGY (1975).
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nuclear power is “like cutting butter with a chain saw.”137 Lovins’
analysis goes well beyond just staking out an anti-nuclear power position. His larger target is the dominant model of energy policy; His
professional career has been dedicated to developing an alternative
energy policy that relies on small-scale, clean, renewable energy production instead of large-scale, dirty, fossil-fuel energy.138
The No Nukes dimension of this alternative is straight forward
but not terribly likely to come about in the near term because of the
large role currently being played by nuclear power and our continued
preference for large-scale power production. The active dimension of
the Smart Policy involves technological innovation as well as restruc139
turing the production and distribution of electricity. A key aspect of
this policy alternative involves distributed generation (DG), which
presents an alternative electricity policy focusing on small-scale
power production.140 The core concept behind DG is that power will
be produced locally instead of relying on large regional grids for
141
transmission and distribution. DG power producers will be much
smaller and will rely on a variety of energy sources and technologies.
What these producers have in common is that they are not traditionally structured utilities and can operate without reliance on the grid.
DG technologies include gas or diesel-fired engines, small tur142
bines, fuel cells, and photovoltaic cells. While some of these fuel
sources are fossil fuels, it is contemplated that DG technologies will
capture both heat and power, thereby increasing energy efficiency.
Other fuel sources are renewable, and therefore cleaner than the fossil fuels burned in large-scale plants. Not all DG technologies are currently cost effective, thus raising the question of whether or not government financial incentives are better applied to nuclear power or to
smart energy markets and technologies.

137. LOVINS, supra note 3.
138. See also AMORY B. LOVINS ET ALS., SMALL IS PROFITABLE: THE HIDDEN BENEFITS
OF MAKING ELECTRICAL RESOURCES THE RIGHT SIZE (2002)
139. Id.
140. The International Energy Agency defines “distributed generation” as ‘generating plant
serving a customer on-site or providing support to a distribution network, connected to the grid
at distribution-level voltages. The technologies generally include engines, small (and micro) turbines, fuel cells, and photovoltaic systems. It generally excludes wind power, since that is mostly
produced on wind farms rather than for on-site power requirement.” International Energy
Agency, Distributed Generation in Liberalised Electricity Markets 19 (2002).
141. Id.
142. LOVINS, supra note 138, at § 1.2.
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Another term for distributed generation is micropower, which
also involves new technologies including microturbines, hydrogen fuels, solar cells, landfill gases, and the like. In this regard, micropower
is touted as a clean energy alternative. According to the International
Energy Agency these technologies are increasing in importance and
“[w]orldwide, more DG capacity was ordered in 2000 than for nuclear
power.”143 Not too much should be taken from this statement because
of the decrease in orders for new nuclear plants. Still, it is fair to as144
sert a worldwide rise in DG and micropower.
DG and micropower are dependent upon significant technological improvements in electricity production, transmission, distribution,
and consumption. Most simply, the scale of generation units is re145
duced significantly and they are widely dispersed. “Smart energy”
technologies are intended to reduce the size of power generation
units; to be closer to the source of consumption; to utilize “smart
grids,” which will transmit power more efficiently; and to use “smart
meters,” which will provide consumers with more information about
their consumption patterns and about their choice of providers.146
The Smart Energy Policy is a return to the electricity future.
When Edison flipped the switch at Pearl Street Station in New York
City on September 4, 1882, the first electricity company went into operation and did so on a small scale.147 Technological advances enabled
the effective nationalization of the electricity grid in the early part of
148
the Twentieth Century. Today, we find ourselves contemplating a
return to small scale production because it promises economic efficiencies by removing producers from the grid; environmental benefits
through greater energy efficiencies and increased use of renewable
energy resources; and energy security advantages from terrorist attack, international supply disruptions, or catastrophic accidents.

143. International Energy Agency, supra note 140, at 7.
144. There is also an increase in the number of smart energy providers of information and
products. See, e.g., http://www.smartpower.org; http://www.smart-nrg.com; http://www.climate
solutions.org; http://www.elpc.org/energy/.
145. VAITHEESWARAN, supra note 8.
146. Energy Future Coalition, Challenge and Opportunity: Charting a New EnergyFuture
Appendix A(4), at http://www.energyfuturecoalition.org/full_report/index.shtm (last visited
Dec. 20, 2004).
147. LEONARD S. HYMAN, ANDREW S. HYMAN & ROBERT C. HYMAN, AMERICA’S
ELECTRIC UTILITIES: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE ch. 14 (7th ed.2000).
148. JILL JONNES, EMPIRE OF LIGHT (2003).
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CONCLUSION
Global warming has revived interest in nuclear power. How
much interest remains to be seen. Still, the most significant statement
that can be made about nuclear power is that this energy source is on
the table for discussion more than it has been for over 25 years, because of the environmental degradation caused by burning fossil fuels.149 Traditional nuclear industry and trade association interests have
taken advantage of this phenomenon to continue to advocate their
Promotional Policy regarding nuclear power. Nuclear agnostics have
added this issue to their own future energy policies because it is an attractive alternative to oil and other fossil fuels, which, in addition to
their role in climate change, are becoming more difficult to find and
secure and, therefore, higher priced. Nevertheless, nuclear power’s
problems persist.
Economic efficiency, environmental protection, energy security,
and potential catastrophes are the building blocks of any energy future. For some policymakers, nuclear power plays a central role in designing that future. If, however, a report card were issued for nuclear
power, then chances are that nuclear power would not graduate to the
energy policy of the immediate future. Instead, nuclear power would
receive failing grades in each category.
Without government subsidies or financial incentives, nuclear
power is not, nor is it projected to be, cost competitive with fossil fuels. While environmentally attractive because of its carbon-free emissions, the nuclear industry has not satisfactorily addressed waste disposal matters. Neither on-site expansion of spent storage facilities,
nor permanent disposal at Yucca Mountain resolve the outstanding
environmental issues yet. Nor does nuclear power achieve even passing grades on energy security and catastrophic incidents if future energy policy adopts a precautionary principle. A Precautionary Policy
would force nuclear power providers to demonstrate the safety and
security of their facilities and reactors; and that proof remains a challenge. Absent a precautionary principle, however, nuclear power
would receive incomplete grades on both scores because of the magnitude of uncertainties.
What, then, is the future of nuclear power? The safest answer is
“More of the same with a twist.” Nuclear power will continue to pro-

149. See, e.g., VAITHEESWARAN, supra note 8, at 278 (“What is fair to say is that after many
years of ignoring nuclear power, policymakers are now starting to engage the issue once
again.”).
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vide about 20% of the country’s electricity needs. Old plants will be
relicensed. On-site waste depositories will expand and Yucca Mountain will eventually receive approval as the permanent off-site waste
storage facility. Price-Anderson Act support will continue, as will
federal funds earmarked for nuclear RDD&D. The twist is that growing concerns about global climate change and national and international security have changed the terms of the debate about nuclear
power’s future. The changed debate raises a serious question about
continuing to invest in nuclear power instead of investing in smart
power.
A Smart Energy Policy provides a real alternative not only to
nuclear power but also to the dominant model of national energy policy. There will be no new nuclear power in a Smart Energy Policy. Instead nuclear energy will play a transitional role. Cleaner and renewable energy resources will be used. Smaller, dispersed, energy
efficient technologies are also a part of a Smart Energy Policy which
sends more accurate price signals, increases consumer choice, and offers energy independence and security. The optimum nuclear future is
then transitional, as we continue to use the nuclear power that we
have, and as we begin to shift public and private investments into
Smart Energy markets.

